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"There is perhaps no more impenetrable jungle in the entire law than that
which surrounds the word 'nuisance.' ... [F]ew terms have afforded so excellent an
illustration of the familiar tendency of the courts to seize upon a catchword as a
substitute for any analysis of a problem."'
I. INTRODUCTION
Two recent cases involving state Right to Farm Acts2 have drawn the
attention of legal scholars, attorneys and laymen alike to the common law doctrine of
nuisance. Both cases found that the Right to Farm Acts in question constituted a
legislatively imposed easement across the property of affected landowners.3  One
court went on to opine that this imposition constituted a "physical invasion" of the
* Jesse J. Richardson, Jr. is an assistant professor in the Department of Urban Affairs and
Planning at Virginia Tech in Blacksburg, Virginia. He received his B.S. and M.S. in Agricultural and
Applied Economics from Virginia Tech. He holds a J.D. from the University of Virginia School of
Law.
** Theodore A. Feitshans is an Extension Specialist and Lecturer in the Department of
Agricultural and Resource Economics at North Carolina State University in Raleigh, North Carolina.
He received his B.S. in Animal Science from Cornell University and his M.S. in Agricultural and
Applied Economics from the University of Minnesota. He holds a J.D. from Georgetown University.
1. W. PAGE KEETN, ET AL, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS §86, at 616 (5th
ed. 1984).
2. See Bornann v. Board of Supervisors, 584 N.W.2d 309 (Iowa 1998); Buchanan v.
Simplot Feeders, Ltd. Partnership, 952 P.2d 610 (Wash. 1998); Buchanan v. Simplot Feeders, Ltd.
Partnership, No. CS-95-236-FVS, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21780 (E.D. Wash.).
3. See Bormann, 584 N.W.2d at 316; Buchanan, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21780 at *1-2.
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affected property owner's land, and thus a categorical taking of private property for
public purposes without just compensation."
This article examines the underpinnings of nuisance as established by
judicial opinions and buttressed by the Second Restatement of Torts and other
scholarly writings.- An in-depth discussion of two recent cases is given followed by
a comparison of the case opinions to the fundamental underpinnings of nuisance
law.6  Upon analysis neither opinion should be considered surprising or
extraordinary, given the history of nuisance.
1I. NUISANCE GENERALLY
As a general rule, an owner is at liberty to use his property as he sees fit,
without objection or interference from his neighbor, provided such use does
not violate an ordinance or statute. There is, however, a limitation to this
rule; one made necessary by the intricate, complex, and changing life of
today. The old and familiar maxim that one must so use his property as to
not injure that of another... is deeply imbedded in our law.'
The general rule that no one has absolute freedom in the use of his property,
but is restrained by the coexistence of equal rights in his neighbor to the use
of his property, so that each, in exercising his right, must do no act which
causes injury to his neighbor, is so well understood, is so universally
recognized, and stands so impregnably in the necessities of the social state,
that its vindication by argument would be superfluouss
"Nuisance" may be defined as:
interference with an owner's reasonable use and enjoyment of his property
by means of smoke, odors, noise or vibration, obstruction of private
easements and rights of support, interference with public rights, such as free
passage along streams and highways, enjoyment of public parks and places
4. See Bormann 584 N.W.2d at 321. The Bormann opinion refers to these types of takings
as per se takings, apparently adopting the taxonomy of the plaintiffs. See id. at 313. The court in Lucas
v. South Carolina Coastal Council, both the majority and dissent, refers to these types of takings as
categorical takings. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015, 1050 (1992).
This article retains the Lucas taxonomy.
5. See discussion infra Parts I-IV.
6. See discussion infra Parts VI-VII.
7. Bove v. Donner-Hanna Coke Corp., 258 N.Y.S. 229, 231 (1932).
.8. Booth v. Rome, W. & O.T.R. Co., 35 N.E. 592, 594 (N.Y. 1893).
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of recreation, and, in addition, activities and structures prohibited as
statutory nuisances.9
A nuisance may be classified as a "public nuisance" or a "private
nuisance."'10 A public nuisance consists of "an unreasonable interference with a right
common to the general public."" A nontrespassory interference with another's
interest in the private use and quiet enjoyment of their land constitutes a private
nuisance." To subject a person to liability for private nuisance, his conduct must be
a legal cause of the interference in someone else's private use interest and quiet
enjoyment of their land. 3 In addition, the interference must be either: (i) intentional
and unreasonable; or (ii) unintentional, but "otherwise actionable under the rules
controlling liability for negligent or reckless conduct, or for abnormally dangerous
conditions or activities."
An intentional interference (or invasion) with another's interest in the use of
land is unreasonable if: (i) "the gravity of the harm outweighs the utility of the
actor's conduct," or, (ii) "the harm caused by the conduct is serious and the financial
burden of compensating for this and similar harm to others would not make the
continuation of the conduct not feasible."'"
In determining the gravity of the harm from an intentional invasion of
another's interest in the use and enjoyment of land, the following factors are
important: (i) the extent of the harm involved; (ii) the character of the harm
involved; (iii) the social value that the law attaches to the type of use or enjoyment
invaded; (iv) the suitability of the particular use or enjoyment invaded to the
character of the locality; and (v) the burden on the person harmed of avoiding the
harm. 6 The following factors weigh heavily in determining the utility of the conduct
that causes the invasion of another's interest in the use and enjoyment of land: (i)
the social value that the law attaches to the primary purpose of the conduct; (ii) the
suitability of the conduct to the character of the locality; and (iii) the impracticability
of preventing or avoiding the invasion.'
The law of nuisance plys [sic] between two antithetical extremes: The
principle that every person is entitled to use his property for any purpose
9. BIAcK's LAw DICTIONARY 961 (5th ed. 1979).
10. See RESTATEMENT (SE OND) OF TORTS § 821A (1979).
I1. Id. § 821B.
12. See id. §821D.
13. See id. § 822.
14. Id.
15. Id. § 826.
16. See id. § 827.
17. See id. §828.
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that he sees fit, and the opposing principle that everyone is bound to use his
property in such a manner as not to injure the property or rights of his
neighbor. For generations, courts, in their tasks of judging, have ruled on
these extremes according to the wisdom of the day, and many have
recognized that the contemporary view of public policy shifts from
generation to generation.'
An unreasonable interference finding is not a question of law but a question of fact
for the jury. 9 Once a nuisance has been determined to exist an appropriate remedy
must be found. A different, but similar, balancing process guides the court in
fashioning a remedy. Many courts balance "hardships" or "equities" in determining
whether to enjoin the nuisance or to grant a judgment for damages." Much
confusion regarding nuisance law results from the tendency of courts to jumble both
balancing tests (unreasonable interference and remedy) together into one analysis.
The fact that courts consider many of the same factors in each balancing test
blurs the lines further. The North Carolina Court of Appeals clearly sets out the
distinction between the two different balancing tests in Parker v. Barefoot.2'
If a trier of fact determines that a defendant's conduct is indeed an
unreasonable interference with another's use and enjoyment of their land,
then the plaintiff is entitled to damages.. .. To award damages, the
defendant's conduct, in and of itself, does not need to be unreasonable... In
contrast, however, injunctive relief requires proof that the defendant's
conduct itself is unreasonable."'
This analysis differentiates the two balancing tests on the basis of distinguishing the
unreasonableness of the consequences of the defendant's actions versus the
unreasonableness of the defendant's actions themselves.'
18. Antonik v. Chamberlain, 78 N.E.2d 752, 759 (Ohio Ct. App. 1947).
19. See Parker v. Barefoot, 502 S.E.2d 42, 46 (N.C. Ct App. 1998) rev'd, 519 S.E.2d 315
(N.C. 1999); KETON ET AL., supra note 1, § 88, at 629 & n.27. While the North Carolina Supreme
Court later reversed the holding, the analysis of the court continues to be valid. See Parker v. Barefoot,
519 S.E.2d 315 (N.C. 1999).
20. See ROBERT R. WRIGHT & MORTON GITELMAN, CASES AND MATERIAI. ON LAND USE 48-
49 (5th ed. 1997).
21. See Parker, 502 S.E.2d at 44. Note that the Parker case involved an intensive hog
facility and the failure of the trial court to explicitly instruct the jury that "the law does not recognize as
a defense to [nuisance claims] that defendants used the best technical knowledge available at the time to
avoid or alleviate the nuisance .... " Id.
22. Id. at46.
23. See KEETON ET AL., supra note i, § 87, at 623 (emphasis added).
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IMI. LEGISLATIVE CHANGES OF COMMON LAW NUISANCE
As recognized by Justice Holmes:
[i]t is settled that within constitutional limits not exactly determined the
legislature may change the common law as to nuisances and may move the
line either way so as to make things nuisances which were not so, or to
make things lawful which were nuisances, although by so doing it affects the
use or value of property.'
Similarly, the zoning classification or the fact that the disputed use has been granted
a governmental license provides persuasive, but not conclusive, evidence for the trier
of fact."
Nevertheless, Constitutional underpinnings make courts reluctant to license
a nuisance.' The United States Supreme Court, in Richards v. Washington Terminal
Company,7 considered the question of legislative legalization of a private nuisance.'
In Richards, the plaintiff filed suit under a nuisance theory to recover for damages
resulting from the operation of a railroad and tunnel by defendant. 9 Plaintiff alleged
that the operation of the railroad and tunnel amounted to a private nuisance.30
Plaintiff's property did not adjoin that of the defendant." Two sets of
railroad tracks ran through and from the tunnel at issue." The defendant installed a
fanning system in the tunnel that caused the gases and smoke (emitted by the trains
while in the tunnel) to be forced out of the south portal." About thirty trains per day
used the tracks.' From the closest point of the plaintiff's home to the south portal,
the distance totaled about one hundred fourteen feet, while the rear end of plaintiff's
lot lay about ninety feet from the middle of the tracks." Three houses stood between
plaintiff's property and the railroad tracks, two of which were purchased and owned
by the defendant."
24. Commonwealth v. Parks, 30 N.E. 174, 174 (Mass. 1892).
25. See JuuAN CoNRAD JUERGENSMEYER & THoMAs E. ROBERTS, LAND UsE PLANNNG AND
CONTROL LAW § 14.7, at 646-47 (1998); Maykut v. Plasko, 365 A.2d 1114, 1118 (Conn. 1976).
26. See JUERGENSMEYER & ROBERTS, supra note 24, § 14.7, at 647.
27. Richards v. Washington Terminal Co., 233 U.S. 546 (1914).
28. See id. at 548.
29. See id.
30. See id. at 549-50.
31. See id. at 548.
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The large amounts of black or gray smoke, dust, dirt, cinders and gases
emitted by the trains as they passed, as well as vibrations from the trains, damaged
plaintiff's property. 7 The fair market value of the property, the rental value and the
value of the personal property within the house depreciated as a result of the railroad
operation. 8
One significant point on which the court appeared to rely was that the
plaintiff conceded that the railroad was not operated negligently and that Congress
authorized the operation. 9 The Court held that the damages resulting from the
plaintiff's close proximity to the portal and the fanning system's gas discharge effect
and smoke imposed "so direct and peculiar and substantial a burden upon plaintiff's
property" as to violate the Fifth Amendment's prohibition against the taking of
private property for public purposes without just compensation.' The Court, in
dicta, stated that "while the legislature may legalize what otherwise would be a
public nuisance, it may not confer immunity from action for a private nuisance of
such a character as to amount to a taking of private property for public use. '
Juergensmeyer and Roberts discuss this issue in terms of the Right to Farm
Acts.42 These authors generally dismiss the notion that Right to Farm Acts can
constitute a taking of private property for public purposes.43 However, they
acknowledge that:
[t]he immunity in effect confers an affirmative easement on the farmer to
cast pollutants of odors, noise, or dust, as the case may be, on the neighbors
land. If this is characterized as a physical invasion, then the prospects in a
taking claim look brighter, but it is not clear that a court would so regard
it.44
37. See id.
38. See id. at 550.
39. See id.
40. Id. at 557.
41. Id. at 553.
42. See JuERGENSMBYER & RoBERTs, supra note 25, § 14.7, at 647 & n.18 (suggesting that
Right to Farm Acts may constitute a taking of private property for public purposes without just
compensation).
43. See id. § 14.7, at 647-48.
44. Id. § 14.7, at 648.
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IV. GRANTING OF PERMANENT DAMAGES AS CONDEMNATION
The seminal case, Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Company,45 a case that all law
students read in torts class, involved a large cement plant near Albany, New York.'
The neighboring landowners alleged a nuisance from the resulting dirt, smoke and
vibration emanating from the plant."7 The court below found a nuisance after trial
and granted temporary damages, while denying injunctive relief." The New York
Court of Appeals remitted the case to the Supreme Court of Albany County "to grant
an injunction which shall be vacated upon payment by defendant of such amounts of
permanent damage to the respective plaintiffs as shall for this purpose be determined
by the court.""" The court acknowledged that, "[t]he theory of damage is the
'servitude on the land' of plaintiffs imposed by defendant's nuisance."' 0 A servitude
is a charge or burden resting upon one estate for the benefit of another."
A vigorous dissent took issue with the ramifications of the permanent
damages remedy in this instance. Judge Jasen felt that,
[i]n permitting the injunction to become inoperative upon the payment of
permanent damages, the majority is, in effect, licensing a continuing wrong.
. This kind of inverse condemnation [citation omitted] may not be invoked
by a private person or corporation for private gain or advantage... Nor is it
constitutionally permissible to impose servitude on land, without the
consent of the owner, by payment of permanent damages where the
continuing impairment of the land is for a private use.52
V. BRIEF OVERVIEW OF RIGHT TO FARM LAWS
All states and some local governments employ some form of a Right to Farm
Act to protect working lands from the encroachment of residential development.
Right to Farm statutes were created to address a growing concern that too much
farmland was being overtaken by urban sprawl. 3 As more urban dwellers moved
into agricultural areas, "nuisance" lawsuits by those urbanites threatened the
45. Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 257 N.E.2d 870 (N.Y. 1970).
46. See id. at 871-872.
47. See id. at 871.
48. See id.
49. Id. at 875.
50. Id. (citing United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 261 (1946)).
51. See BLAcK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1229 (5th ed. 1979).
52. Id.
53. See Margaret Rosso Grossman & Thomas G. Fischer, Protecting the Right to Farm:
Statutory Limits on Nuisance Actions Against the Farmer, 1 Wis. L. REv. 95, 97-98 (1983).
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existence of many farms.' Nuisance suits frustrated farming operations and
encouraged farmers to sell to developers, continuing the cycle."
Right to Farm laws may be categorized generally into six different types: (i)
traditional; (ii) laws requiring the use of GAAMP's; (iii) laws listing specific
protected agricultural activities; (iv) laws protecting animal feedlots; (v) laws
requiring creation of agricultural districts; and (vi) local ordinances. ' Traditional
Right to Farm laws basically protect farm operations that existed prior to residential
encroachment.' These laws codify the "coming to the nuisance" defense. '
Activities that are negligently run are not afforded the protection of Right to Farm.59
The "coming to the nuisance" defense suggests that the "first one to arrive
fixes forever the character of the area."' However, some courts refuse to recognize
the defense."' Those courts recognizing the defense of coming to the nuisance
merely use it as a factor to consider.' The prevailing rule provides that, absent a
prescriptive right,
the defendant may not condemn the surrounding premises to endure his
operation, and that the purchaser is entitled to a reasonable use and
enjoyment of his land to the same extent as any other owner, so long as he
buys in good faith and not for the sole purpose of vexatious lawsuit.'
Spur Industries, Inc. v. Del E. Webb Development Company," though
recognizing this principle, put a new twist on the remedies question."5 Spur remains
the landmark remedies case in nuisance, also read, like Boomer, by all law students.
Webb, a real estate developer, brought a nuisance action against Spur, who ran a
cattle-feeding operation.' Spur commenced the cattle feeding operations in an
agricultural area well outside boundaries of any city.' Subsequently, Webb
purchased land nearby and commenced an extensive retirement community
54. See id. at 97.
55. See id.
56. See Nm.. D. HAMILTON, A LIvEsTOCK PRODUCER'S LEGAL GUIDE To: NUISANCE, LAND
UsE CONTROL, AND ENVmoNmENrAL LAw 24 (1992).
57. See JUERGEN EYER & ROBERTS, supra note 25, § 14.6, at 645.
58. See id.
59. See id.
60. Id. § 14.4,at 640 & n.10.
61. See id. § 14.4, at 640 & n.9.
62. See id. § 14.4, at 640&n.10.
63. KErrTON ET AL., supra note 1, § 88B, at 635.
64. Spur Indus., Inc. v. Del E. Webb Dev. Co., 494 P.2d 700 (Ariz 1972).
65. See id. at 707.
66. See id. at 705.
67. See id. at 704.
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development." The Supreme Court of Arizona held that Webb was entitled to enjoin
Spur's cattle feeding operation as a nuisance. 9 However, the court further held that
Webb had "brought people to the nuisance to the foreseeable detriment of Spur." 0
Therefore, the court ordered Webb to indemnify Spur for a reasonable amount of the
cost of moving or shutting down.7' One may argue that the court in Spur allowed the
plaintiff to "condemn the surrounding premises to endure his operation.
72
The second type of Right to Farm law protects farmers who use Generally
Accepted Agricultural Management Practices (GAAMPs). 3 The third type of right
to farm law specifically lists certain agricultural practices. 74 For example, a law may
list odors from livestock, manure, fertilizer or feed as protected." Some laws also
protect feedlots specifically. Other forms of Right to Farm laws provide different
legal protections to farm operations located within a designated agricultural district.76
Finally, some local governments have passed Right to Farm ordinances.
Most of these ordinances are similar to the traditional Right to Farm laws, but many
local governments have passed innovative Right to Farm ordinances.'
VI. BORMANN V. BOARD OF SUPERVISORS OF KOSSUTH COUNTY, IOWA
In Bormann v. Board of Supervisors,8 the Iowa Supreme Court held that one
Iowa Right to Farm law constituted a taking of private property from the neighbor of
the farmer for public purposes without just compensation." The defendants applied
to their local county Board of Supervisors for approval of an "agricultural area" they
wanted to establish.' The proposed agricultural area included the land of several
neighbors as well as that of the defendants."' The agricultural area proposed
encompassed 960 acres and the Board subsequently approved the application.'
68. See id.
69. See id. at 706.
70. Id. at 708.
71. See i.
72. KEEON ET AL, supra note 1, § 88B, at 635.
73. See HAMILTON, supra note 56, at 25.
74. See id. at 26.
75. See Spur Indus., Inc., 494 P.2d at 708.
76. See HAMILTON, supra note 56, at 27.
77. Seeki. at 28.
78. Borman v. Board of Supervisors, 584 N.W.2d 309 (Iowa 1998).
79. Seeid. at 311.
80. See id.
81. See Id.
82. See id. at 312. The approval actually occurred on the second application. See id. at 311-
12. For procedural reasons, a third vote was necessary. See id. at 312. None of these procedural issues
affected the substance of this case.
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An agricultural area in Iowa includes, among other activities: raising and
storing of crops; the care and feeding of livestock, the treatment or disposal of waste
resulting from livestock, and the creation of noise, odor, dust or fumes.'3 Iowa law
further provides that a farm or farm operation located in an agricultural area does not
constitute a nuisance." This classification holds regardless of the established date of
operation or the date of the agricultural activities expansion of the farm or farm
operation."
This immunity from nuisance suits does not apply to nuisances resulting
from: (i) a violation of a federal law or regulation; (ii) a violation of a state law or
rule; (iii) the negligent operation of a farm or farm operation; (iv) an injury to a
person or damage to property caused by the farm or a farm operation prior to
creation of the agricultural area; or (v) an injury or damages sustained by the person
bringing suit "because of pollution or change in condition of the waters of a stream,
the overflowing of the person's land, or excessive soil erosion onto another person's
land, unless the injury or damage is caused by an act of God."'"
The Iowa Code defines nuisance as "whatever is injurious to health,
indecent, or unreasonably offensive to the senses, or an obstruction to the free use of
property, so as essentially to unreasonably interfere with the comfortable enjoyment
of life or property."'" Iowa Code section 657.2 lists certain activities that constitute a
nuisance:"
I. The erecting, continuing, or using of any building or other place
for the exercise of any trade, employment, or manufacture, which, by
occasioning noxious exhalations, unreasonably offensive smells, or other
annoyances, becomes injurious and dangerous to the health, comfort, or
property of individuals or the public.
2. The causing or suffering any offal, filth, or noisome substance to
be collected or to remain in any place to the prejudice of others.
4. The corrupting or rendering unwholesome or impure the water of
any river, stream, or pond, or unlawfully diverting the same from its natural
course or state, to the injury or prejudice of others."
83. See IOWA CODE § 352.2(6) (1999).
84. SeeMi. § 352.11(1Xa).
85. See id.
86. Id. § 352.11(l)(b).
87. Id. § 657.1.
88. See id. § 657.2.
89. Id.
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Note that this statutory definition of nuisance does not modify common law
nuisance.' The common law fills in the gaps of the statute.
With this background, the court in Bormann addressed whether the Right to
Farm law at issue in that case constituted an unlawful "taking."' The Fifth
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution provides that private property [shall not] be
taken for public use, without just compensation."92 The United States Supreme
Court has fashioned a test to determine whether a government regulation exacts a
taking of private property without just compensation.93 An interpretation of the test
delineated in Lucas follows:
A. Is the purpose of the regulatory action a legitimate state
interest?
94
1. if yes, go to B.;
2. if no, a compensable taking has occurred.95
B. Does the means used to achieve the objective substantially
advance the intended state purpose?96
1. if yes, go to C.;
2. if no, a compensable taking has occurred.97
C. Does the alleged taking compel the property owner to suffer a
physical invasion of his property (or the equivalent)?98
1. if yes, a compensable taking has occurred; 99
2. if no, go to D.
D. "No economically viable use" test:'0 0
1. Does the alleged taking deny the property owner of all
economically beneficial or productive use of the land?'0 '
i. if yes, go to 2.;
ii. if no, go to E.
2. Does the regulation simply make explicit what already
inheres in the title itself, in the restrictions that the background
90. See Bormann v. Board of Supervisors, 584 N.W.2d 309, 314 (Iowa 1998).
91. See id. at 315.
92. U.S. CoNsT. amend. V.
93. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1030-32 (1992).
94. See id. at 1014-15.
95. See id. at 1015.
96. See id. at 1024.
97. See id. at 1026.
98. See id. at 1015.
99. See id.
100. See id. at 1016-1019.
101. See id. at 1016.
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i. if yes, go to E.;
ii. if no, a compensable taking has occurred.' 03
E. Apply the Penn Central balancing test,'04 balancing:
1. the economic impact of the regulation on the landowner;'0 5
2. the landowner's investment backed expectations;' 06 and,
3. the character of the government activity.
0 7
In applying the Lucas test, the Iowa Supreme Court declared that under Iowa
law, the right to maintain a nuisance suit is an easement." An easement is an
interest in land that entitles the owner of the easement to use or enjoy land in the
possession of another.'" A right of way for ingress or egress is a common type of
easement.
The Court found that the Board's approval of the application for an
agricultural area triggered the provisions of the state statute affording the applicants
immunity from nuisance suits." °
This immunity resulted in the Board's taking of easements in the neighbors'
properties for the benefit of the applicants. This amounts to a taking of
private property for public use without payment of compensation in
violation of the Fifth Amendment to the Federal Constitution. This also
amounts to a taking of private property for public use in violation of article
1, section 18 of the Iowa Constitution.'
102. See id. at 1028-29.
103. See id. at 1029.
104. See id. at 1017-18; Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124
(1978).
105. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 124.
106. See id.
107. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1030-32; Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 124.
108. See Bormann v. Board of Supervisors, 584 N.W.2d 309, 315 (Iowa 1998).
109. See RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 451, cmt. a (1944).
110. See Bormann, 584 N.W.2d at 321.
Ill. Id. Note that the language of the Iowa Supreme Court's holding also implies that a
taking could be found under the first prong of the Lucas test. See id. Namely, if the easement was for
the "benefit of the applicant," the governmental action appears to lack a proper purpose. See id. The
Iowa Supreme Court goes on to state that the action was for "public use," however, with no explanation.
See id. Contrast this approach with the Boomer dissent. See discussion supra Part IV.
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By taking this easement from the neighboring landowners, the action of the Board
essentially physically invaded the neighbors property."' The state now allowed the
farmer to conduct activities that constituted a nuisance, where the farmer was not
allowed to conduct these activities in the past."' In other words, the Iowa Supreme
Court reasoned that this law took one of the sticks (the right to not be subject to
unreasonable interference with the reasonable use of your land) from the bundle
representing the property rights of the farmer's neighbor.
Thus, the third prong of the takings test, as set out previously, had been
met."4 This step constitutes a categorical taking; meaning that no further inquiry is
necessary to determine if the action amounts to a taking of private property for
public purposes without just compensation."'
The Bormann court cited Richards v. Washington Terminal Company"' in
which the United States Supreme Court neither explicitly reasoned that the right to
maintain a nuisance suit was an easement, nor discussed easements as physical
invasions."" However, the definitions of nuisance and easement lend themselves to
the categorization. The categorical rule of takings for physical invasion easily
applies to easements. Therefore, the Bormann result and reasoning comports with
the United States Supreme Court's decision in Richards. Similarly, the Bormann
result adheres to hornbook land use law as recognized by Justice Holmes in
Commonwealth v. Parks," over 100 years ago.
VII. BUCHANAN V. SIMPLOTFEEDERS LIMITED PARTNERSHIP AND IBP
Another court decision, from Washington state, raises further concerns about
the constitutionality of Right to Farm Acts across the country. Buchanan v. Simplot
Feeders Limited Partnership and IBP"9 involved judicial opinions by the Supreme
Court of Washington and the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Washington.
20
112. See Borman, 584 N.W.2d at 317-21.
113. Seeid. at 316.
114. Seeid. at 317-21.
115. Seeid. at 321.
116. Richards v. Washington Terminal Co., 233 U.S. 546 (1914).
117. See id. at 546-58.
118. See Commonwealth v. Parks, 30 N.E. 174, 174 (Mass. 1892).
119. See Buchanan v. Simplot Feeders, Ltd. Partnership, 952 P.2d 610, 612 (Wash. 1998);
Buchanan v. Simplot Feeders, Ltd. Partnership, No. CS-95-236-FVS 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21780, at
*1 (E.D. Wash. May 29, 1998).
120. See Buchanan, 952 P.2d 610; Buchanan, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21780, at '1.
2000]
Drake Journal ofAgricultural Law
The Buchanans purchased a farm in 1960 and began farming in 1961."'
The farm grew alfalfa, row crops, orchard fruit and melons." In 1969, a small
feedlot was developed on adjoining property that was previously rangeland.'" In
1970, a beef processing plant was built near the feedlot.'I
In 1979, IBP installed a wastewater lagoon system. The system was in
compliance with government permits, but it was uncontroverted that it
emitted odors. In 1983, IBP obtained approval to expand its wastewater
system. In 1993, IBP obtained approval to again expand its wastewater
system by replacing the existing lagoon with a larger one covering forty
acres. In 1995, IBP obtained approval to expand the sprayfield on which it
[placed] wastewater, from 255 acres to 1,538 acres.'
In 1992, Simplot purchased the feedlot and substantially expanded
operations to 580 acres of pens holding an estimated 40,000 head of cattle." Like
IBP, Simplot was in compliance with the applicable county permits and regulations
for the land.' 27
Plaintiffs complained that manure, dust, and fly infestations from the
defendants' land ruined their crops." Furthermore, the smell from both the
defendants' operations infringed on the enjoyment of their property. 29  The
Buchanans filed suit against Simplot and IBP. 3' Both opinions in this case
addressed the issue of Washington State's Right to Farm Act and its relationship to
Simplot and IBP.'3' The Washington Supreme Court answered questions certified to
it by the U.S. District Court, which had diversity jurisdiction over the case.1
2
In a finding similar to the conclusion in the Bormann case, the Supreme
Court of Washington found that the Washington state Right to Farm Act gives the
protected farm "a quasi-easement against urban developments to continue those
activities.'3 The question of the constitutionality of the Washington State Right to
121. See Buchanan, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21780, at * 1.
122. See id.
123. See id.
124. See id. at *1-2.






131. See id. at *11; Buchanan v. Simplot Feeders, Ltd. Partnership 952 P.2d 610, 612 (Wash.
1998).
132. See Buchanan, 952 P.2d at 616.
133. Id. at 616.
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Farm Act was not certified to the Washington Supreme Court, so this finding is
likely dicta.
Several other issues make the Buchanan opinions interesting. First and
foremost, both courts found that Washington state's Right to Farm Act only applied
to nuisance suits arising from subsequent nonagricultural development and filed by
one engaged in a nonagricultural activity." Therefore, the Washington state Right
to Farm Act does not apply when an agricultural or other rural person files suit
against an agricultural enterprise.'
Secondly, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Washington held that IBP did not qualify for protection in any case because meat
processing is not an agricultural activity." The court construed agricultural activity
narrowly. In contrast, the court found that Simplot's feedlot operation, although an
unconventional farm constituted an agricultural operation.'17  Again, however,
because of Buchanan's status as a farmer, the Right to Farm Act did not apply.'
Finally, like Bormann, the complaining party in the Buchanan cases was not a
recently transplanted suburbanite. To the contrary, in both cases, the complaining
party was another farmer.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In light of the Richards case, as well as other early nuisance case law, like
Boomer, the holdings in Bormann and Buchanan are neither a surprise nor a
contradiction of basic nuisance principles. Jurists recognized as early as the Boomer
case, the allowance of a nuisance constitutes an easement.'39 In the early cases the
concern centered upon the awarding of permanent damages, which, in essence,
allowed the taking of private property for private purposes with just compensation."4
Today, the early dissenters have gathered a majority in the Bormann court.'4'
The Bormann result and reasoning find firm foundation in settled nuisance
law principles and takings law reasoning. 2 In elucidating these basic, yet difficult,
134. See id. at 615; Buchanan, v. Simplot Feeders, Ltd. Partnership, No. CS-95-236-FVS,
1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21780, at *11 (E.D. Wash. May 29, 1998).
135. See Buchanan, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21780, at *11.
136. See id.
137. See id. at "14.
138. See id.
139. See discussion supra Part IV.
140. See discussion supra Part V.
141. See discussion supra Part VI.
142. See discussion supra Part I-VI
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principles the Bormann court brings the law back to the future. The Bormann
opinion, and its ramifications, are not anomalies.
Nonetheless, Bormann may remain a minority rule for two reasons. First,
courts of other jurisdictions may decline to find that Right to Farm laws create
easements despite dicta in Buchanan that supports that view. 3 Such a finding
implies that a wide range of regulatory restrictions, like wetland protections and
endangered species habitat protections, may also create easements. Widespread
adoption of the Bormann reasoning on easements as a physical invasion results in
unprecedented restrictions on the ability of the federal government to regulate land
use for environmental protection.
Secondly, even if other courts hold that Right to Farm Acts create easements,
the courts may not be willing to take the further step and hold that such easements
constitute a physical invasion. Indeed, many easements, including the entire class of
negative easements, appear to involve no physical invasion.'" The reasoning of the
Iowa Supreme Court in holding that the easement created by the Right to Farm law
amounts to a physical invasion is less than clear.4"
If the easement creates no physical invasion, then no categorical taking
results and the Penn Central balancing test must be applied.'" Therefore, whether
other courts will find a particular Right to Farm law constitutes a taking of private
property for public purposes without just compensation remains unclear.
143. See Buchanan v. Simplot Feeders, Ltd. Partnership, 952 P.2d 610,615 (Wash. 1998).
144. See BIAcK's LAw DIcTrONARY 457-58 (5th ed. 1979). Negative easements are those
easements "where the owner of the servient estate is prohibited from doing something otherwise lawful
upon his estate, because it will affect the dominant estate." id. at 458.
145. See discussion supra Part VI.
146. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
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